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Efficient Self Protection in Clustered Distributed System Using Access Detection

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***Abstract*— The complexity of today's distributed computing environment is such that the presence of bugs and security holes is statistically unavoidable. A very promising approach to the present issue is to implement a self-protected system. Self-protection refers to the ability for a system to detect illegal behaviors. This article demonstrates the implementation of self-protection manager which targets clustered distributed systems. Our approach is based on the global database of the clustered distributed applications. This knowledge permits to detect known and unknown attacks if an prohibited (illegal) access is performed. The prototype is designed using access detection.**

***Keywords*— Cluster security, self-protection, LAN device.**

I. INTRODUCTION

The assumptions correspond to the point of view of a machine provider which rents his cluster infrastructure to different customers. It is assumed that each customer has a set of machines completely allocated to the applications. However, the native network and the Internet access are shared by all the applications. Therefore, the threat may arrive from outside of the cluster through the web. The main aim of this paper is to present the improved method for self-protected system in the context of cluster-based applications. It is considered that the hardware environment is composed of a cluster of machines interconnected through a local area network with an Inter net access via a router. The software environment is composed of a set of application components deployed on the cluster.

The approach is based on the access provided to the particular user in a cluster to access a particular process. Any attempt to use a process which is not allowed for a particular user is trapped and the access to that process is rejected. Legal access for different process to different users in the cluster is maintained by the Deployment Manager. The main characteristics of the system are: 1) to reduce the perturbation on the managed system whereas providing high reactivity, 2) to change the configuration (and reconfiguration) of security components when the system evolves, and 3) to keep the protection manager (which implements the protection policy) independent from the protected legacy system. The purpose of the work is not to replace the existing tools but rather to provide a systematic approach that allows more closely-coupled interactions between them, so that the cluster wide, coordinated reaction against an attack can become automated, and thus, more efficient.

The main limitation relates to the scope of the detected attacks and to the allowed process; the current system can only detect attacks which use illegal process based on the information in the global Catalog. In order to validate our approach, we applied it to the self-protection of a cluster of machines.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 presents our Implementation details. Section 4 presents Flowchart. The evaluation is reported in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.

II. LITERATURE SURVEY

This section reviews the main tools and techniques currently used by security experts to fight against intrusions and the existing systems which implement a self-protected behavior.

A. *Intrusion Detection*

In [20], two main approaches have been explored to ensure intrusion detection: misuse intrusion detection and anomaly intrusion detection. These approaches have been used in the case of Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).

Snort[19] is an example of such systems. This approach induces alittle range offalsepositives however cannot notice unknown attacks. Anomaly intrusion detection tries to identify irregular behaviors of the system by shaping the traditional behavior of the system (instead of attacks). The system is discovered and any misdeed is signaled.

An early work [6] modelled and verified behavior correctness at the level of system calls. Recent examples of anomaly-based detection can be found in [17], [8], [9], and [5]. This approach can detect unknown attacks but at the price of a lot of false positives.

B. *Backtracking Tools*

In [14], Backtracking tools record detailed data about the system activity so that once an intrusion attempt has been detected; it is possible to determine the sequence of events that led to the intrusion and the potential extent of the damage (e.g., data theft/loss).

The Taser system [10] provides the ability to restore the system in a trusted state. It enhances the file system with a selective self-recovery capability.

C. *Self-Protected Systems*

Self-protected systems avoid miss communication between systems and provide security to the system. Self-protected systems are systems which are able to autonomously fight back intrusions in real time.

Rootsense [15] is an example of self-protected system. It differs from classical IDS within the sense that it detects and blocks intrusions in real-time. It audits events within different level of the host operating system and correlates them to comprehensively capture the global system state.

MLIDS [1] (multilevel intrusion detection system) is another example of self-protected system. MLIDS automates the detection of network attacks and proactively protect against them.

The Self-cleansing system (SCS) [11] is another solution to build self-protected software. It targets replicated servers which are stateless(e.g., web servers) involving a load-balancing strategy. This bearish approach makes the assumption that all intrusions cannot be detected and blocked. In fact, after a certain time, the system is considered to be compromised. Hence, it periodically reinstalls a part of the system from a secure repository. However, the solution only applies to stateless components.

However the self-protected tools are invaluable for system administrators as they are not powerful enough to ensure good levels of security, for several reasons. First of all, most detectors can only protect the system against known attacks. Therefore, pirates are always a length ahead with the resort to new “exploits”, which are able bypass filters and scanners. The purpose of our work is not to replace the existing tools but rather to provide a systematic approach that allows more closely-coupled interactions between them, so that the cluster-wide, coordinated reaction against an attack can become automated, and thus, more efficient.

D. *Summary*

From this work, it is analyzed that a self-protected system should be 1) be fully automated both in its configuration and its reaction to intrusions, 2) fire near-zero false positive since the response is automated, and 3) induce a low-performance overhead on an application performance to enable real-time protection.

III. Implementation Details

The approach is based on the access provided to the particular user in a cluster to access a particular process. Any attempt to use a process which is not allowed for a particular user is trapped and the access to that process is rejected. Legal access for different process to different users in the cluster is maintained by the Deployment Manager .

A. *Deployment Manager*

Role of Deployment Manger is to create global database and if required maintain the database. Global database will contain information regarding i) the number of machines in the cluster , ii) the number of process in each machine in the cluster, iii) the user groups allowed / not allowed for each user. Deployment Manager Collects information of machines in clusters and identifies the processes on each individual machines. Identify user groups that allowed access for these process and prepares a global database.

B. *Self Protection Manager*

Role of Self Protection is to fire Query to the machines which are in the cluster. Query will be asking for processes running in the machine under the specific user.

In reply to the query fired by self-protection manager, the machine replies with the processes running under the specific user. Self-Protection manger in turn will verify the reply given by machine with the global database.

When an illegal access of the processes from an undefined user is detected, the self-protection manager quickly stops that request.

C. *Proposed Algorithm*

Algorithm I

1: Collect information of machines present in cluster.
2: Identify the processes on each individual machine.
3: Identify the user groups that allowed access for these processes.
4: Prepare a global catalog which includes this information.

Algorithm II

1: Collect information about current running processes on each individual machine in cluster.
2: Identify the owner of these individual processes.
3: Send these owners along with processes to the DM.
4: Allow/Terminate processes depending on DM response.
5: Repeat the process periodically.

D. *Control Loop Reactivity*

This experience evaluates the time between the detection illegal access and the termination of compromised process. Our objective is to keep the time delay at its minimum level. The infrastructure corresponds to that of Fig.1.



Fig. 1 : System Model

IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION

Clusters are used to evaluate our self-protection system.

The deployment manager and self-protection manager will be developed in .net technology. We will be using SQL Server as our database. This will work only on the windows operating system. The illegal access will be identified through deployment manager and self-protection manager.

V. CONCLUSION

Today, distributed computing environments are increasingly complex and difficult to administrate. This complexity is such that the presence of bugs and security holes is statistically unavoidable. Therefore, access control policies become very difficult to specify and to enforce. Following the autonomic computing vision, a very promising approach to deal with this issue is to implement a self-protected system which is able to distinguish legal (self) from illegal (nonself) operations. The detection of an illegal behaviour triggers a counter-measure to isolate the compromised resources and prevent further damages. In this we have designed and implemented self-protection system whose main characteristics are: 1) to reduce the perturbation on the managed system whereas providing high reactivity, 2) to change the configuration (and reconfiguration) of security components when the system evolves, and 3) to keep the protection manager (which implements the protection policy) independent from the protected legacy system. In this when an illegal access of the processes from an undefined user is detected, the self-protection manager quickly stops that request.

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